CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND NINETY-FIRST MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 27 August 1970, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. H. TANAKA (Japan)

(Previous verbatim records in this series appeared under the symbols ENDC/PV.1-ENDC/PV.430).

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Argentina:	Mr. C. ORTIZ de ROZAS
	Mr. A.F. DUMONT
Brazil:	Mr. R.E. SARAIVA GUERREIRO
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	Mr. L.F. PALMEIRA LAMPREIA
Bulgaria:	Mr. T. PETROV
	Mr. I. PEINIRDJIEV
Burma:	U KYAW MIN
Canada:	Mr. G. IGNATIEFF
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	Mr. R. BORSARELLI
	Mr. U. PESTALOZZA

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Romania:	Mr. I. DATCU
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	Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
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	Mr. A.F. NEIDLE
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Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Japan): I declare open the 491st plenary meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

2. Mr. LEONARD (United States of America): Our work during this session on chemical and biological weapons has, in our view, been both encouraging and disappointing. It has been encouraging because there is under active consideration a practical proposal to prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons. I refer, of course, to the draft convention submitted by the United Kingdom (CCD/255/Rev.2*) and now supported by the United States and others. Specifically, we are encouraged because no delegation has said anything this year which indicates to us that this is an unsound proposal.

3. With respect to chemical weapons we are encouraged because a number of delegations have begun a serious effort to learn more about the complex military, technical and other factors which must be studied and explored before real progress can be made. On the other hand, there has been an unwillingness on the part of some delegations to pursue this important effort as well as to seize the opportunity to negotiate a comprehensive international convention on biological weapons. A number of delegations have belittled serious study of the inherent problems in the field of arms control of chemical weapons by asserting that political decisions must now be taken and that technical studies are merely excuses for failing to make progress.

4. The reasons for United States support of the United Kingdom draft convention have been stated in the past. I shall not take the time of the Committee to restate them. The United States Government, in essence, took a decision to renounce the production and stockpiling of biological weapons, supplemented by a decision to do the same with respect to toxins because of their close affinity with biological weapons. I might add that this was a political decision, one based on all relevant factors: political, military and technical. As many representatives know, our decision was the product of nine months' intensive study. It is our hope that other governments will soon be prepared to make the same political decision and join in an international convention which would make the renunciation of biological warfare broadly binding throughout the international community. We are disappointed that other key countries have not so far been ready to take this positive step.

5. Let me discuss now some of the reasons which have been advanced to justify delay in negotiating a biological warfare convention. In response to our explanation that there are intrinsic differences between biological and chemical weapons which justify

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their separate treatment, we have been told that both those types of weapons are weapons of mass destruction and therefore must be dealt with simultaneously. But it is simply not accurate to give the whole class of chemical weapons the label of weapons of mass destruction. Is an incapacitating chemical agent a weapon of mass destruction? I think not. Moreover, is it suggested that all weapons of mass destruction must be treated simultaneously? Is it seriously to be considered that nuclear weapons, which are unquestionably weapons of mass destruction, must be eliminated at the same time as biological and chemical weapons or the latter will not be dealt with at all? Again I think the answer is negative.

6. It has been suggested to us also that, logically, chemical and biological weapons should be treated together because they are aimed at the destruction of living beings. That seems to us a superficial argument. Bullets are aimed at injuring people, as are shrapnel and virtually all weapons of war. But surely that is not an argument for treating all weapons in one comprehensive instrument.

7. We have also been told that implementation of the United Kingdom proposal would undermine the rules embodied in the Geneva Protocol (A/7575/Rev.1, annex VI) because the Geneva Protocol deals with both kinds of weapons. That, frankly, is incomprehensible to us. The Geneva Protocol outlaws the use of both types of weapons. It would of course strengthen the Geneva Protocol in every possible respect if we could immediately conclude an effective and reliable treaty eliminating both types of weapons. That, however, is not possible and we do not know at this time whether or when it will be possible. Under these circumstances it seems to us self-evident that it would be a strengthening, not a weakening, of the Protocol to eliminate either class of weapon. If either class were eliminated, then surely it would be less likely that that type of weapon would be utilized, and thus the Geneva Protocol would be strengthened to that extent.

8. However, the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union has told us on a number of occasions that implementation of the United Kingdom proposal —

> "... constitutes a direct danger in that it will promote the build-up by States of arsenals of chemical weapons and increase the risk of the use of such weapons in international conflicts." (CCD/303, para. 3)

That assertion cannot be supported either by experience or by logic. As to experience, I can state that the United States has completely halted the production of biological weapons since President Nixon's statement of last November — almost a year ago.

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During that time we have not produced any lethal chemical weapons either, and we are not producing them at this time. We wonder what the representative of the Soviet Union could have in mind. If what is happening in the United States is not relevant, which countries does the Soviet representative believe would be stimulated to greater production of chemical weapons by the adoption of the United Kingdom draft convention?

9. That is, of course, a rhetorical question. We do not believe that any country will be stimulated to greater production of chemical weapons by a treaty obligation to renounce biological weapons. The logic of this assertion is evident, since the two classes of weapons have different functions. Biological weapons are unquestionably weapons of mass destruction. In view of the time required for them to take effect, they do not have much utility as weapons of retaliation or deterrence. Chemical weapons, on the other hand, have been utilized in the past as tactical weapons. They have an immediate, not a delayed, effect; they are more predictable and controllable in their action; and they are thus effective retaliatory weapons -- weapons whose possession by one Power deters their use by some other Power; they are primarily battlefield weapons. Accordingly, the two types of weapons broadly serve different functions and it is unsound, therefore, to conclude that if you give one of them up you can make up for that by increased production with respect to the other.

10. We have explained all of this earlier. Nevertheless we have continued to hear repetitions of the argument that giving up biological weapons would stimulate production of chemical weapons. Let us leave behind the period in which such arguments are substituted for genuine analyses of the relevant factors, whether they be political, military or technical.

11. Before concluding this section of my statement on biological weapons I should like to summarize the essential reason why the United States believes that biological weapons can and should be treated separately from chemical weapons. Basically, biological weapons are different from chemical weapons; and that truth has been demonstrated by over fifty years of history. No amount of argumentation can persuade us that the two types of weapons are the same when one has been made use of in warfare and the other has not.

12. Please note that I have said that the two classes of weapons are different, not that one is more important or more urgent or more dangerous than the other. That is not where we base our argument in favour of separate treatment for the two classes.

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Both are important; both are urgent; both are dangerous. But one class presents a relatively simple disarmament problem; the other presents a very complex task. One can be dealt with rather quickly; the other cannot. That simple truth, based on years of history and the unavoidable facts of contemporary life, lies at the heart of our attitude towards the control of chemical and biological weapons.

13. Turning now to the control of chemical weapons, I have already said that we are pleased that this Committee has begun its investigation of problems that must be looked into if we seriously hope to achieve workable prohibitions in the field of chemical weapons. In particular, I refer to such contributions as the working papers of Canada (CCD/300), Japan (CCD/288; CCD/301), Italy (CCD/289; CCD/304), Sweden (CCD/287), Yugoslavia (CCD/302), the United Kingdom (CCD/308) and others. However, those papers obviously represent only a beginning. It will take time to do the research required in order to give sensible, helpful answers to the important questions posed, for example, in the Canadian working paper. For our part, we shall study these working papers carefully and shall attempt next year to carry forward the essential exploration of all the technical, military and political problems involved.

14. I said that it will take time to get seriously into all the problems of chemical weapons, and that we have recently only just begun to do so. Naturally the question arises, how much time might be required before we are in a position actually to frame a draft instrument prohibiting manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons? No one can answer that question. We hope, of course, that it will take less rather than more time. However, if we are to be realistic we must appreciate that in the case of other important agreements in the arms-control field it took many years before there was a sufficient degree of understanding, a sufficient breadth of consensus, to ripen into concrete agreement. A test ban was first proposed in the early 1950s. Technical expertise was gained in the late 1950s at a Geneva meeting of experts; negotiations took place both in the late 1950s and in the early 1960s; but, as we all know, a partial test ban was concluded only in 1963 (ENDC/100/Rev.1).

15. I cite that point not to demonstrate that any particular number of years must necessarily elapse before the international community is able to record a broadly-accepted international agreement on chemical weapons. I mention it only to remind us that we have a long and difficult road ahead, particularly since the terrain we must traverse is virtually uncharted.

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16. One thing, however, is absolutely certain if we are to reach our goal. We shall not be assisted by statements such as those made on a number of recent occasions by the sponsors of the socialist draft treaty (A/7655), to the effect that technical studies are excuses to avoid progress. It would, after all, be at least equally plausible to suggest that the sponsorship of an impractical and seriously defective treaty was motivated by a desire to avoid progress. However, we notice at least one encouraging statement from the Soviet delegation. At our meeting on 11 August Mr. Roshchin said:

> "... elaborating and agreeing on forms and methods of control is a complex, involved process in which numerous political and military-technical factors play a part." (CCD/PV.486, para. 38)

That statement has our complete agreement.

17. It follows from what I have said about the necessity for detailed, serious study of the problems of controlling chemical weapons that the draft convention put forward at the General Assembly by the Soviet Union, two of its constitutent republics, and six of its allies simply does not measure up to its proclaimed objectives. It does not begin to cope with the problems inherent in the task of controlling chemical weapons, and therefore it cannot possibly be a basis for negotiation.

18. The inadequacy of this socialist draft treaty is particularly evident in two areas. First, it is impossible to ascertain from studying the text, or the explanations that have been given to us, what is being prohibited. Second, whatever is being prohibited, the means of verification are virtually non-existent.

19. Article 1 of the socialist draft convention states that each party --

> "... undertakes not to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons."

The draft, however, contains no definition of what is a chemical weapon. This is an important matter. Is it intended to prohibit only weapons in the sense of munitions that have already been filled with chemical agents? Is it intended to permit unlimited stockpiling of chemical substances which have been manufactured for use in munitions but have not yet been placed in munitions -- substances such as mustard gas and nerve agents? What is the intention of the draft with respect to chemicals which are used in industry but can also be used directly to inflict casualties on the battlefield? I refer, of course, to substances like chlorine and phosgene, which we all know were effective in past wars. Chlorine, for example, was effectively used in the battle of Ypres when the gas was released from ordinary industrial containers that had been transported from the factory to the front.

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20. Those are not abstract questions. They must be considered and they must be answered. We say, not that they are insoluble, but that we shall arrive at sound solutions only after serious study — study along the lines suggested by our Canadian and Italian colleagues, and by yourself, Mr. Chairman.

21. With respect to the scope of prohibition, the socialist draft is obviously defective in yet another way. Mr. Roshchin told us at our meeting on 14 July that as a result of this convention all — and I emphasize "all" — chemical and bacteriological weapons "would be destroyed and would cease to exist" (CCD/PV.478, para.126). He continued: "That understanding stems clearly from the draft convention proposed by the socialist States and no additions or changes in the text are required." (ibid.) I take it that we may assume not only from the statement I have just quoted, but from other statements of the Soviet Union as well, that tear-gas munitions are considered by the Soviet Union to be chemical weapons.

22. Is it, then, the proposal of the Soviet Union and of the six other countries associated with that proposal that all tear-gas munitions, which have been used to maintain internal order in over sixty countries, are to be completely eliminated? If that is not their proposal, then surely some standards or limits as to types and amounts of tear-gas munitions to be possessed would have to be worked out. And surely there would have to be some procedure at the very least for reporting, or for control, regarding the tear-gas munitions retained. But we see no such provision of any sort in the socialist draft convention. So perhaps it is not incorrect to assume that this draft contemplates the complete elimination of all tear-gas munitions. We would welcome clarification.

23. I have said that the second major deficiency of the socialist draft convention is that it is seriously lacking in provisions for verification. That remark takes account of the amendment proposed by the Polish delegation and others, whereby it is expressly recognized that States may lodge complaints before the Security Council (CCD/285 and Corr.1). As we have pointed out before, a provision recognizing the existing right to make a complaint to the Security Council is inadequate for prohibitions on production and stockpiling, because it may not be known whether or not there are grounds for complaint until it is too late.

24. With respect to the basic question of verification, we must point out that this is indeed a real and a serious problem. The Soviet representative has stated on several occasions that the ability to retaliate against the use of chemical weapons is a deterrent to their first use by others. I take that to be the meaning of the

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Soviet delegation's working paper (CCD/303), which states that the existing reservations to the Geneva Protocol provided the basis for a warning to the Axis Powers in the Second World War. Let me recall the statement then issued by President Roosevelt, on 8 June 1943. In that statement the President of the United States promised "full and swift retaliation in kind", and warned —

> "... the Axis armies and the Axis people in Europe and Asia that the terrible consequences of any use of these inhumane methods on their part will be brought down swiftly and surely upon their own heads".

25. Since the Soviet Union is apparently of the same view as the United States with respect to the relationship between the ability to retaliate and the ability to deter, we must assume that the Soviet Union maintains substantial stockpiles of chemical weapons for possible use if it is attacked with chemical weapons. However, as must be evident from the working paper which the United States submitted on 16 July (CCD/293), it is extremely difficult to know, for example from photographs, what quantity of chemical agents or munitions has been manufactured or is continuing to be manufactured in any industrial country. In these circumstances the United States would have no way of knowing, if the socialist draft convention were to be adopted, whether all or only a fraction of the existing chemical weapons possessed by the Soviet Union had been destroyed pursuant to the treaty, or whether the Soviet Union was continuing to produce chemical munitions or was retaining a capability to produce chemical munitions quickly and secretly. Thus what the Soviet delegation is calling for is not so much "a political decision" as "an act of faith."

26. It is often said that chemical weapons are not likely themselves to be decisive weapons in modern war. That is to say, it is sometimes asserted that if one side in a major conflict had retained some chemical weapons but the other side had not, that would not make the difference between victory or defeat. It is therefore concluded that risks may be accepted in the interest of taking an important step forward in the field of arms control.

27. We submit that that is seriously defective reasoning. It has been a fundamental principle of our negotiations in the last decade that arms-control agreements are to be fashioned in a way that avoids granting a significant advantage to one party or another. Without doubt, the retention of significant quantities of chemical weapons or agents by one side, which would be possible without detection under the socialist draft convention, could give a significant advantage to one side and a significant disadvantage to the other. Such a treaty would be an unsound measure.

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28. The question arises, what would be adequate verification for a comprehensive chemical-weapons convention? In all frankness we must respond that we do not know the answer to that question. Only future study — detailed and serious study by many countries working here in a realistic way on all the elements of the problem -- will in time provide the answer.

29. The international community has recently concluded one treaty which does contain procedures for reliable international verification. That is, of course, the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*). An interesting parallel exists between that treaty and the problem of a chemical-weapons convention; although the distinctions are, of course, also apparent. In both situations it is important to consider the means of controlling materials which go into the weapons: in the case of nuclear weapons it was deemed essential to have controls applied over fissionable materials; in the case of chemical weapons there is inescapably a problem of what control should exist over the agents, such as nerve agents and mustard, which would go into chemical munitions. The non-proliferation Treaty shows us a kind of verification which the Soviet Union considered appropriate, indeed necessary, on the territory of other States in order to gain assurance that other parties were not making weapons contrary to the prohibitions of the treaty.

30. I should like to call attention to another provision of the socialist draft treaty — that is paragraph 3 of article 7. According to the text in United Nations document A/7655, that paragraph says that the socialist convention would enter into force after the deposit of a certain number of instruments of ratification,

> "... including the instruments of ratification of the Governments of States which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and of other Governments designated as depositaries of the Convention."

We wonder what would be the practical result of that provision. Is the Soviet Union proposing that a comprehensive prohibition on chemical and biological weapons should come into force only after it is ratified by each permanent member of the Security Council? In other words, is the Soviet Union suggesting that each permanent member may determine whether or not this treaty ever enters into force?

31. I would not mention this matter if it were a mere technicality related to the so-called formal or final provisions of the draft treaty. In fact, the question of which countries, and how many, are essential parties for any arms-control treaty is a matter of basic significance. I find it curious, therefore, that the socialist

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draft uses this highly unusual formulation — indeed, I know of no precedent for it —, since the Soviet Union and its allies were prepared to accept the ratifications only of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union as sufficient for the limited test-ban Treaty and the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty to come into force. The extraordinary and unusually cumbersome procedure for the socialist draft convention on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons to come into force suggests at the very least that the Soviet Union may not actually assign that degree of urgency to the problem of those weapons that the representative of the Soviet Union has claimed on a number of occasions.

32. Permit me to quote one such statement:

"In view of the danger, increased in recent years, of the use of chemical and bacteriological agents of warfare, and in view of the creation in several countries of particularly destructive weapons of this type, the problem of their complete prohibition has become extremely urgent" (CCD/PV.449, para. 41).

Frankly, I find it difficult to reconcile that remark with the unusual formula proposed for the coming into effect of the socialist draft convention.

33. Much has been said in this Committee about the need to take political decisions. It is indisputable that governments must at some point take political decisions with respect to arms-control treaties that are ripe for conclusion. On 18 August the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom explained at considerable length what inevitably must be involved in the process of making responsible political decisions (CCD/PV.488, para. 16). Those comments seem to us particularly wise and revealing, and the United States delegation associates itself fully with them.

34. When the question of political decisions arises it is also relevant to consider what political decisions have already been taken by important participants in negotiations. Permit me to summarize the political decision which has already been taken by the United States. That is a decision to renounce the production and stockpiling of biological weapons and to work as hard as possible for a broadly-accepted international agreement in which others would join in renouncing biological weapons. That decision was taken in the belief that a biological-weapons treaty might be elaborated and concluded, provided there was good will on all sides, in the relatively near future. That decision was accompanied by a decision to work within this Committee in a serious way on the problems that may permit us in time to achieve further prohibitions regarding chemical weapons.

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35. It seems to us that the decision taken last year by the Soviet Union was a very different sort of political decision. It was a decision to join with its allies in submitting to the General Assembly, at a time when this Committee was in session and had under consideration the subject of chemical and biological weapons, a draft treaty which by its sweeping character had an immediate superficial political appeal but which swept under the rug a great many difficult problems. And at the same time, apparently, the Soviet Union decided to oppose in this Committee the detailed technical investigation of these problems, a greater understanding of which could permit us to make real progress with respect to a treaty on chemical weapons.

36. As I indicated earlier, the United States does agree with one of the principal points made by the representative of the Soviet Union during these debates. This is the point that the possession by one or another nations of chemical weapons can deter the initiation of their use. We do not agree, however, that this applies to biological weapons. We believe that governments should study seriously the political, technical and military considerations which should lead them to join the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries in deciding that biological weapons need not be produced and stockpiled and thus kept available for retaliation.

37. We have taken our far-reaching decision because of our assessment that biological weapons do not have an effective retaliatory capability — an assessment that all countries and mankind as a whole would be better off if we were to take a political decision that even the use of disease as a weapon of war by one country would not result in additional disease being visited upon mankind by other countries. We continue to hope that still more countries, including the Soviet Union, will be prepared to take this decision. When that happens we shall be able to take an important step forward — the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of biological weapons. Such a step would be an important strengthening of the Geneva Protocol, which President Nixon has just submitted to the United States Senate for advice and consent to ratification; and it would be a significant encouragement to us in our efforts to make progress as rapidly as we can towards a treaty on chemical weapons.

38. Mr. NATORF (Poland): Today we should like to make some comments concerning the total elimination of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare. For a number of years, in statements both here and in the General Assembly, the Polish delegation has clearly expressed its views on those weapons of mass destruction. However, since

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the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland, Mr. Josef Winiewicz, made a statement on this subject in this Committee on 14 April (CCD/PV.464), certain developments have taken place to which we should now like to refer.

39. On 21 May the World Health Assembly, in its resolution WHA 23.53 entitled "The rapid prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons", declared:

> "... the use not only of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons but also of any chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents for the purposes of war might lead to a disturbance of ecological processes which in its turn would menace the existence of modern civilization".

I should like to stress the words "any chemical and bacteriological (biological) agent for the purposes of war".

40. It is gratifying to note that the declaration concerning the scope of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (A/7575/Rev.1, annex VI) prepared by the twelve non-aligned countries (END/265) and adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 2603 A (XXIV) (CCD/275) is steadily gaining ground. Progress is clearly demonstrated by the votes obtained by the two resolutions. The United Nations resolution of 16 December 1969 was adopted by an overwhelming majority of eighty votes in favour to three against; but resolution WHA 23.53 was adopted unanimously by the World Health Assembly; and that is an extremely encouraging sign. That is particularly true if we keep in mind that the World Health Assembly is the most competent international body for the evaluation of the consequences of the use of these weapons in international conflicts.

41. Another positive development is the reaction to resolution 2603 B (XXIV), in which the General Assembly invited all States which have not yet done so —

> "... to accede to or ratify the Geneva Protocol in the course of 1970 in commemoration of the forty-fifth anniversary of its signing and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations".

We appreciate the announcement made by the representative of Morocco (CCD/PV.466, para. 8) and by the representative of Japan (CCD/PV.471, para. 30) that their countries had ratified the Geneva Protocol. We understand that Brazil has also become a party to the Protocol. We hope that in the very near future the Geneva Protocol will become an instrument with universal adherence. In the meantime we must note with regret that out of the twenty-six members of this Committee one has shown some reluctance in this regard. Different reasons have been advanced in order to justify the hesitations of the United States Government in this important field. According to the International Herald Tribune for 25-26 July,

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"The United States Government's inaction on the Protocol fosters the impression that it intends to continue to utilize methods of warfare in Indochina that have been widely condemned at home and abroad and which should have been abandoned long ago by a nation that prides itself on its adherence to humane standards of conduct." (page 8)

42. We of Poland sincerely believe that the same motive plays a considerable role in the attempts to split the two main components of the Geneva Protocol by proposing a convention solely for the prohibition of biological weapons, which in fact would not only fail to solve the problem of the complete prohibition of chemical and biological weapons but would mean, in essence, the legalization of the use of some chemical means of warfare.

43. May I be permitted to recall the statement made on 14 April, during our spring session, by the Polish Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Winiewicz, in commenting on that important problem? He said:

"Either we concentrate our efforts to ban effectively and unconditionally all chemical and bacteriological (biological) means of warfare, thus contributing to disarmament, or we indirectly, by omission, justify the miscalculated and dangerous policy of the continued use of chemical means of warfare, whatever benevolent explanation the users of such weapons might give." (CCD/PV.464, para. 15)

44. May I, at this juncture, express the hope that the United States will soon ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925 as understood in resolution 2603 A (XXIV), thus confirming the vote cast by the United States delegation at the World Health Assembly in favour of resolution WHA 23.53 and contributing substantially to the solution of the problem to which I have just referred?

45. It can be seen that we are still faced with a problem requiring a political solution, and that the amount of scientific data provided for our use by experts in the informal meetings of this Committee will not solve the question. The Polish delegation has studied carefully the contributions made by the experts who have participated in our meetings; but we cannot fail to note that in the final analysis their findings or advice always supported the political stand of their respective governments. Of course, we too could call upon experts to provide technical data and draw attention to the numerous difficulties connected with the verification of a ban on biological means of warfare. An example of this was given at our meeting on 28 July in the statement made

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by the delegation of Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.482, paras. 23 et seq.), but in that case with the will to contribute positively to the solution of the problem before us. That is why the Czechoslovak statement ended with practical and realistic proposals. We are convinced that if the course of action I have mentioned is followed by the Western Powers, it will not bring us any closer to a generally-acceptable solution.

46. It is not surprising that the question of chemical and biological weapons occupies a prominent place in the deliberations of our Committee. For the first time we are faced with the possibility of the complete elimination of the weapons of mass destruction which exist in military arsenals. That fact alone adds weight to our responsibility, and the time factor cannot be neglected. When we started our work in the spring we had before us the draft conventions submitted for our consideration and discussion by the delegation of the United Kingdom (ENDC/255/Rev.1) and the delegations of nine socialist countries (A/7655). Each of those documents represented a different approach. Our task was then to try to work out an answer to the question which of the two approaches was likely to produce the results requested of us in resolutions 2603 A and B (XXIV).

47. We are happy to note that almost all the delegations have addressed the Committee on this question. At this time we can say without any risk of error that only the United States and its closest allies have declared themselves in favour of the draft treaty submitted by the delegation of the United Kingdom, which deals with biological means of warfare only. Although the United Kingdom delegation made some attempts in the course of last year to improve some aspects of its draft (ENDC/255) which lent themselves to criticism, some delegations believe that the decision of the United Kingdom Government, announced on 2 February, that it no longer regarded the use in war of CS gas as covered by the prohibition on chemical weapons contained in the Geneva Protocol considerably undermined the credibility of the United Kingdom's declared attempt to strengthen the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The inclusion in the draft treaty of the prohibition on toxins in addition to biological means of warfare, as proposed by the United States delegation at the 474th meeting (CCD/290), although improving the text, did not alter the fundamental weakness of the United Kingdom document.

48. It has now become obvious that very wide support has been voiced for the more comprehensive solution based on the proposal contained in the draft convention of the nine socialist countries. In response to the wish expressed by a number of delegations

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at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly and by a number of speakers at this Conference, important additions to the draft convention of the socialist countries have been put forward by Hungary, Mongolia and Poland (CCD/285).

49. We recognize also that some efforts have been deployed by the other side, including the United Kingdom delegation; but to our regret the conclusions drawn from a number of interesting analyses concerning the verification of chemical weapons have not been encouraging.

50. In admitting that the question of the elimination of chemical and biological weapons is de facto a problem calling for a political decision, the United Kingdom delegation points out a number of considerations which governments must take into account in arriving at a decision of that kind. I quote from the statement made by the United Kingdom delegation at the meeting of our Committee on 18 August:

> "There are military considerations, including the nature of the weapon in question, and, most important perhaps, there are considerations of international security." (CCD/PV.488, para. 20)

It is precisely these considerations which call for the early elimination of all chemical and bacteriological (biological) means of warfare from national armouries. In confirmation of this, permit me to quote the relevant part of the report of the Secretary-General, as follows:

> "Because chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons are unpredictable, in varying degree, either in the scale or duration of their effects, and because no certain defence can be planned against them, their universal elimination would not detract from any nation's security." (A/7575/Rev.1, para. 374)

The report states further, in the same paragraph:

> "In short, the development of a chemical or bacteriological (biological) armoury, and a defence, implies an economic burden without necessarily imparting any proportionate compensatory advantage to security. And, at the same time, it imposes a new and continuing threat to future international security." (ibid.)

51. Now that all the militarily-significant countries have acceded to or have entered upon the procedure for ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, to speak of military considerations in connexion with chemical weapons does not seem to be an act of good faith towards States parties to this international instrument. In the

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light of the numerous United Nations resolutions inviting those who have not yet done so to accede to the Geneva Protocol, it has been recognized that governments responding to this appeal are taking an important political decision, including an act of good faith as understood in the laws of treaties.

52. The Polish delegation notes with regret that, despite so much discussion in this Committee, agreement has still not been reached on the basic issue of simultaneous treatment of chemical and biological weapons. We have, however, created an atmosphere in which the problem can be studied in depth with well-intentioned polemics and through careful consideration of any rational solutions — and here I can only add that, in spite of the repetition in Mr. Leonard's statement today of the well-known position of the United States on chemical and biological weapons, we still consider that an atmosphere has been created in the Committee which allows us to be reasonably optimistic as far as the future is concerned. We believe it is fair to say that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, since it has come to grips with the problem of chemical and biological weapons, has been generally recognized to be dealing with a question of high priority with serious chances of success in this particularly important aspect of general and complete disarmament.

53. It is time, therefore, that we began in earnest our search for ways of reaching generally-acceptable solutions. A number of interesting proposals by several non-aligned members of the Committee have been put forward with a view to helping in the elaboration of a formula generally acceptable to the members of each group represented in this Committee. We highly value the constructive spirit of the statements of the delegation of Sweden at our meeting on 21 July (CCD/PV.480), the delegation of Mexico at our meeting on 23 July (CCD/PV.481), and the delegation of Morocco on 28 July (CCD/PV.482), including the working paper submitted by that delegation (CCD/295); the statement of the delegation of Yugoslavia on 11 August (CCD/PV.486) and its working paper (CCD/302); and, lastly, the very constructive statement by the delegation of the United Arab Republic at our meeting on 25 August (CCD/PV.490). One common feature manifested in those statements, besides the attempt to suggest formulas to constitute the base of an acceptable solution, is that they make it quite clear that it is necessary to maintain a balance in considering the political aspects of the problem of the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons and the technical aspects of the problem of verification of such a prohibition.

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54. Many of the proposals are put forward with a view to developing the system of guarantee envisaged in the draft convention of the nine socialist countries. Poland, as a co-author of that draft and of the working paper (CCD/285) concerning the procedure of complaints to the Security Council for the investigation of cases of violation of the convention, believes that many of those proposals are very thoughtful, deserve careful consideration and in some cases form the basis for further negotiations. We are happy to join those representatives who have favourably commented on those proposals. We would simply like to add that the Swedish formula of verification by challenge, when properly applied, can breed positive solutions. An example of this was the dismissal by an international commission of the accusation of genocide suggested remotely against the Government of Nigeria during the civil war in that country.

55. We understand that certain proposals contained in the working paper presented by the Yugoslav delegation (CCD/302) come close to previous Swedish suggestions; and we note with interest that they also develop in an interesting manner the notion of national means of verification envisaged in articles 4 and 5 of the draft convention proposed by the socialist countries.

56. As it has done in the case of all working documents submitted to this Conference, the Polish delegation has carefully studied the working paper (CCD/295) presented by the delegation of Morocco. We highly appreciate the thoughtfulness it demonstrates in advancing suggestions that lay the groundwork for a generally-acceptable solution. I would venture to suggest that negotiations be undertaken for the preparation of a juridical document along the lines suggested in the Moroccan paper. We are convinced that reasonable guarantees and safeguards for both biological and chemical weapons can also be elaborated that would, for example, enter into force for a precisely-prescribed period — a test period — during which experience could be gained that would show whether corrections were necessary for the future strengthening of safeguard measures. The possibility of establishing a not-too-distant date for a review conference specially devoted to the purpose of updating the guarantee system could also be taken into account.

57. We are of the opinion that that suggestion corresponds to the spirit and principles incorporated in the memorandum of the twelve non-aligned countries on the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare (CCD/310) submitted to this Committee at our last plenary meeting. Needless to say, the Polish delegation welcomes that document and will give it the attention it deserves.

58. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): I have the honour to present the document which has just been circulated under the symbol CCD/313 and contains a draft comprehensive programme of disarmament prepared by the delegations of Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia, for the purpose of facilitating fulfilment of the mandate which the General Assembly of the United Nations gave to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in its resolution 2602 E (XXIV) (CCD/275), approved on 16 December 1969, in which, moreover, it expressly requested the Committee to report to it on this subject at its twenty-fifth session. As a background to that resolution and to the draft programme to which I have just referred, mention should be made of suggestions advanced in this connexion last year by the delegations of Italy (CCD/245, 263) and Romania (CCD/PV.400, paras. 75 et seq.), and the proposal made by the Secretary-General in the introduction to last year's annual report (A/7601/Add.1).

59. In the preparation of the draft the co-sponsors have borne that background very much in mind, as well as the Netherlands working paper of 24 February (CCD/276); the relevant paragraphs of the Mexican working paper of 5 March (CCD/277); the results of the informal discussions which were held, on the initiative of the Italian delegation, in April by a number of delegations, including the three co-sponsors of the draft programme which I am now presenting; the ideas on the question contained in the statements of almost all representatives here, a number of whom, including the two co-Chairmen of the Committee, have made statements entirely devoted to the question we are now considering; and, lastly, the exchanges of views in which we have been actively participating during the past two weeks with the representatives of the nine other non-aligned countries.

60. Having thus briefly outlined the background to the document, we think it would now be appropriate to say a few words concerning its content and its presentation in the form of an introduction and five sections.

61. It seems to us worth while to begin by saying that the term "disarmament" is used in this document, as it has been used in various forums of the United Nations, in its generic sense -- that is, as a term that encompasses and may designate any type of measures relating to the matter, whether for the prohibition, for the limitation, for the reduction or for the elimination of armaments.

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

62. The introduction is designed principally to summarize the essential provisions of General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV) in self-explanatory terms. We need therefore only stress the two general conclusions which, in the opinion of the co-sponsors, logically and inevitably derive from that summary: that the comprehensive programme of disarmament should embrace not only the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament but also all negotiations and other acts dealing with the question, whatever may be the form or the forum in which they may take place, and that the programme should include effective procedures in order to facilitate the co-ordination of such activities, thereby avoiding duplication of effort and ensuring that the United Nations General Assembly should be kept informed of progress and thus be in a position properly to fulfil its functions, including the constant assessment of the situation.

63. The aim of the programme is described clearly and concisely in the first section of the document: to achieve tangible progress in order that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control may become a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and economic and social progress is a reality.

64. Regarding the twelve principles included in section II, we think it is only necessary to stress -- since their wording is quite clear -- that in the first of these principles we have wanted to make it quite clear that the measures referred to in the programme should be carried out in accordance with the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations (ENDC/5) approved in September 1961 by the United States and the Soviet Union, and with due regard, furthermore, to the obligations assumed under various disarmament treaties in force, the relevant United Nations resolutions and all new elements and possibilities in this field. In the second principle we have stressed with equal clarity the often-agreed-upon priority for measures of nuclear disarmament, extending it to other weapons of mass destruction and at the same time specifying that it should not be interpreted as preventing the adoption of any other disarmament measure whenever this is ripe for agreement.

65. That second principle is of special relevance for the correct interpretation of the execution of the various measures referred to in section III, entitled "Elements and phases of the programme". It should also be borne in mind, in this connexion, that the intention of the co-sponsors is that all the principles set out in section II — all, I repeat — must perform, with respect to the activities designed to put into practice the concrete measures set out in section III, the same role which the United Nations Charter assigns to the principles it enacts. In other words, they should serve as a standard for everything that is done.

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

66. Concerning the last two sections of the programme, I believe the only comment I need add is that, while specific recognition is given to the close relationship existing between disarmament, international security, the peaceful settlement of disputes and the creation of an atmosphere of trust and confidence among nations, it has also been clearly brought out that progress in any of those categories of measures should not be subject in any way whatsoever to progress in the others.

67. In conclusion, I should like to say that the co-sponsors are convinced that the document which they are submitting formally today for the consideration of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is a working instrument which, whatever may be its other merits, at least defines a programme which is at the same time realistic and ambitious, detailed and flexible. In brief, it is a draft which we venture to hope will enable the Committee to fulfil the mandate entrusted to it by the General Assembly in resolution 2602 E (XXIV) and will, if approved by the Assembly at its forthcoming session -- of course with the amendments which its Members consider proper -- put the disarmament negotiations back on the right path so that progress can be made in the field not only of collateral measures but also of measures that are an integral part of the process whose objective is general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which is still, as the General Assembly itself has reiterated, the most important question facing the world today and the goal which best meets the aspirations of all the peoples on earth.

68. That is why we are convinced that approval by the Assembly of a comprehensive disarmament programme will hold pride of place among the various actions by which the United Nations intends to celebrate its twenty-fifth anniversary.

69. Mr. KHATTABI (Morocco) (interpretation from French): Today I shall make a few comments on the subject of a detailed disarmament programme in the light of General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV) (CCD/275). In declaring the decade beginning in 1970 to be the Disarmament Decade, the United Nations General Assembly entrusted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament the task of working out --

> "... a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control".

At first sight that resolution seems to request us to draw up a plan comprising classified subjects that can be examined and discussed by this Committee. That conception of a detailed disarmament programme leads us to put a somewhat awkward question: What practical use could there be in such a programme of work intended

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either to replace the agenda of the Committee adopted in 1968 (ENDC/236, p. 2) or to coexist with other initiatives of the past intended to classify the various aspects of disarmament? To answer that question we must consider first of all some points relating to the idea itself of a programme for the cessation of the arms race and for disarmament.

70. The Joint Statement by the Soviet Union and the United States of 20 September 1961 (ENDC/5) recommended among other things the implementation of a "progressive" disarmament programme "by stages" ensuring that such disarmament should be general and complete and accompanied by the adoption of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes. That Statement, which was adopted shortly afterwards by the United Nations General Assembly (resolution 1722 (XVI)), thus facilitated the preparation in 1962 of two draft treaties submitted respectively by the Soviet Union (ENDC/2/Rev.1) and the United States (ENDC/30 and Add. 1-3). Those two texts contain wide and ambitious programmes reflecting in some sort the legitimate aspirations of the international community and its growing hope of life in a peaceful world freed from the danger inherent in the constant improvement of ever more terrible weapons.

71. It did not take long for the reality — which is often harsh — of the international political context and for the difficulty and complexity of the problem of disarmament to prove that it was impossible to achieve at a single stroke a solution to this problem, which requires the adoption of methods that are far more flexible, more realistic and more adapted to the very nature of relations between States, and especially to the circumstances in which negotiations on any particular disarmament measure might be started. The result of that reality is that the two texts I have just mentioned are now no more than a happy and remote memory; the notion of "general and complete disarmament" has been replaced in practice by that of "collateral disarmament measures"; the word "elimination" has yielded its place to words like "prevention" or "limitation"; while the race in all kinds of armaments continues at its usual pace and reaches disturbing proportions each year.

72. After that past experience — during which some significant successes in preventive disarmament measures were none the less registered — we are now again faced with the awesome duty of drafting a detailed programme to guide us forward towards disarmament.

73. In the important statement U Thant made in this Committee on 18 February (CCD/PV.450) he reminded us that components of that programme are already in some of our documents. Since then various delegations have endeavoured to identify the components of a base on which a detailed programme could be drafted. Ideas on the nature and character of that programme, the method to be followed, and the way to classify the various questions

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have been put forward at this session; and therefore the Committee now has before it a number of definite proposals for the drafting of the programme.

74. My delegation does not intend at this time to speak in detail on the proposals before the Committee. That is why I shall limit myself today to making some comments on certain special aspects of the question before us.

75. The close links which exist between progress towards disarmament and the problems of international security and the maintenance of peace are an indisputable fact. However, one may wonder how far that interdependence could influence the efforts exerted in both directions. In that connexion I should like to quote here two comments of particular interest to my delegation.

76. The first, made by the head of the United States delegation during the meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 23 June, was this:

> "Our subject is inextricably bound together with basic national security concerns, with alliance and treaty commitments, and with other facets of foreign, domestic and ideological policies." (CCD/PV.472, para. 11)

That comment clearly illustrates the complexity and diversity of the problem of disarmament, which should give us food for thought in our efforts to work out a detailed disarmament programme.

77. The second comment was made by Mr. Roshchin of the Soviet Union. Referring to the opinion expressed by certain delegations that progress could not be made in disarmament unless parallel solutions were found in the field of international peace and security, he said that —

> "Such an approach would result in the Committee's having either to concern itself with the elaboration of subject-matter outside its competence or to hold up agreement on disarmament measures pending the favourable development of international events and positive results from the work of international bodies seeking ways of ensuring peace and international security." (CCD/PV.486, para. 24)

78. To that pertinent comment we would add that solid foundations for the maintenance of peace and the preservation of international security have actually existed since the promulgation of the United Nations Charter. The General Assembly has adopted a number of resolutions on the subject. As an example I may cite resolution 1815 (XVII), which defines the principles on which friendly international relations should be based. Those principles, which since 1964 have been under examination by a special committee, concern non-recourse to force, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-intervention, and so on. It is therefore important to strengthen the United Nations and to increase its

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effectiveness by all possible means, including strict compliance with the undertakings and obligations flowing from the Charter, the decisions of the United Nations and international agreements. Needless to say, the adoption of new disarmament measures, particularly in regard to weapons of mass destruction and the cessation of the arms race, contributes greatly to the improvement of international relations.

79. Participation in disarmament negotiations by all the nuclear Powers has been rightly emphasized by most delegations. The representative of Japan went even further by expressing the hope that --

> "... the Governments of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of France will take part in international disarmament negotiations as soon as possible." (CCD/PV.471, para. 34)

Yet we do not see how we can imagine the participation in the near future of all the nuclear Powers in these negotiations. Examination of that delicate question is probably far beyond the competence of our Committee. But, since the General Assembly has instructed this Conference to draft a programme bearing upon all the aspects of the problem, one can only wonder what measures could be thought of to induce a State such as France -- which is distinguished not only as a nuclear Power but even more by its influence as a permanent member of the Security Council and by its political, cultural and moral weight in international, European and Mediterranean affairs — to take part in the disarmament negotiations. In any event we must hope that all the Powers capable of contributing effectively to the solution of this complex and important problem will be able to sit at the negotiation table, even outside the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament if that is necessary in order to achieve substantial agreements of world-wide scope.

80. Many delegations have emphasized the need to give so-called conventional armaments their appropriate place in the disarmament programme. Mr. Leonard even devoted his entire statement of 13 August (CCD/PV.487) to that question, and at the same time submitted to us a working paper (CCD/307) containing among other things the list of principles established by Mr. Foster to guide regional arrangements for the limitation of armaments. That text, as well as the full range of the ideas expressed by the head of the United States delegation, calls for thoughtful study so that it can be discussed thoroughly on another occasion.

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81. Nevertheless, I feel I must make a preliminary remark now. The slowing-down of the arms race is a principle which my country has always defended ardently. Yet I must emphasize that the concept of regional limitation of conventional arms might in certain cases be deceptive and meaningless, particularly when it closely affects the security and the vital interests of certain countries which seek only to defend themselves against aggression, to repel foreign occupation, or simply to reassert a lawful right that conforms with the principles of the Charter. It must be added that this type of limitation, which could be dangerous for certain countries, does nothing to stop the arms race. Consequently we must consider the international situation — that is, the forces deployed, the degree of involvement of Powers, and lastly the very character of certain conflicts. That being said, it is clear that the problem of conventional arms could best be solved by global measures aimed at a radical cessation of the arms race.

82. Before concluding, I would make one last comment on the subject of the programme which the General Assembly has asked us to prepare. A close scrutiny of the criteria mentioned by the various delegations shows clearly that the establishment of such a programme is a delicate and difficult task, because it consists certainly not in preparing a balance sheet or a classified index of subjects, but in an act which we wish to be positive and realistic, flexible and coherent, ambitious and reliable. The programme, therefore, must be based on clear and well-considered concepts; it must look forward but not lose sight of the objectives and principles defined earlier, the results achieved and the present possibilities.

83. That kind of programme, since it must stimulate and guide our Committee and all the other international bodies dealing with the problem of disarmament, might well take the form of a United Nations declaration comprising two main chapters: the cessation of the arms race, and general and complete disarmament under effective international control. I am putting forward here an idea which, when crystallized, could be presented as a formal proposal. In any event, everything possible must be done to make the Disarmament Decade a firm and solid starting-point for work achieving in the years to come a substantial reduction of military expenditure in the world and a progressive cessation of the arms race, particularly in weapons of mass destruction.

84. Mr. PETROV (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): If there is one question on our agenda whose urgency or importance for peace and international security can be denied by no one, it is certainly the total prohibition of chemical and

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bacteriological (biological) weapons. Everyone agrees that by their very nature these weapons represent an ever-increasing and frightful danger to the existence of all mankind. Scientists, who are best able to realize this danger, have almost unanimously opposed these inhuman weapons. Recently the members of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences made an appeal stressing the perils inherent in the use, production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons and asking for the conclusion of an agreement completely prohibiting them. The Bulgarian Government has always urged that these horrible weapons be eliminated for ever from military arsenals. Thus it was one of the enthusiastic co-sponsors, among the other Governments of the socialist countries, of the well-known draft convention on the total prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons (A/7655).

85. It is absolutely imperative that an understanding relating to such a prohibition should be reached within the shortest possible time. Any delay, any temporizing will only give a new impetus to the production and stockpiling of these weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, until they are eliminated once and for all, the temptation to use them will be ever present. In fact, there is evidence that chemical toxic agents have been used and are still being used in a so-called "little war". Moreover, chemical and biological weapons gravely endanger man and his environment even in time of peace. That fact has been eloquently illustrated by the difficulties which the United States authorities encountered in connexion with some sixty-six tons of the neurotoxic agent GB. In fact, those sixty-six tons of GB were only a small quantity if we take into account the following information that appeared in a Swiss newspaper:

> "According to General Hebbeler, Director of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Section, the present stocks of GB possessed by the United States Army are sufficient to kill 10,000 million persons." (La Voix Ouvrière, 22 August)

86. We are glad to note that our draft convention (A/7655) has been welcomed by the Committee. Nevertheless, a difference of views on two principal problems has become apparent between the majority of the members of the Committee and some delegations. The first concerns the joint prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons in a single document; the second, control over chemical weapons. These two could be called a single problem, because in our view the reason why these countries insist that the two types of weapons should be dealt with and prohibited separately is the difficulty of establishing such control. Nevertheless, for greater clarity we shall deal with these two aspects in turn.

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87. As for the first problem, we still believe that a total and joint prohibition of chemical and biological weapons is the best solution for the task which has been entrusted to us. The arguments advanced by the representative of the United States both in the past and today, by the representative of the United Kingdom and by several other delegations have not convinced us of the contrary view. Historically, as is very rightly said in the working paper presented by the delegation of the Soviet Union (CCD/303), these weapons —

> "... have consistently been considered together in view of the common characteristics of these types of weapons of mass destruction. The prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons is provided for in a single international instrument -- the Geneva Protocol of 1925." (para. 3)

Why treat them separately today? If these two categories of weapons were not similar by their very nature, if the Geneva Protocol and all the relevant resolutions of the United Nations did not exist, we could envisage such a possibility. But that is not the case, because if we prohibited biological weapons in a special treaty and left chemical weapons on one side, it would logically follow, per argumentum a contrario, that the latter weapons were admissible and allowed as methods of warfare, and we should run the risk of an increase in their production and stockpiles and consequently in their use. Article VI of the United Kingdom draft convention on the prohibition of biological methods of warfare (CCD/255/Rev. 2*) cannot dissipate that danger. The inclusion of this article shows only that in fact the Geneva Protocol would be weakened by this convention and that this article has been judged necessary in order to strengthen and reinforce it artificially.

88. It is gratifying that the majority of the members of the Committee consider, however, that a complete and joint prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons is necessary. May I mention, first of all, Sweden, Yugoslavia, Morocco, the United Arab Republic, India — in fact, the whole of the group of non-aligned countries as well as the socialist countries? For example, on 21 July the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, said on this subject:

> "We have taken as a basis for our considerations the draft convention put forward by nine delegations in New York last year (A/7655) as amended here in April (CCD/285). The main reason for this is that it covers both chemical and biological means of warfare." (CCD/PV.480, para. 4)

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Similarly, the working paper submitted by the representative of Morocco, Mr. Khattabi, on 28 July states:

"The development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons should be jointly prohibited by the terms of one principal legal instrument which would also make provision for the destruction of such weapons." (CCD/295)

That is also the meaning of the statement made by the representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Khallaf, on 25 August (CCD/PV.490, paras. 39 et seq.) and of paragraph 6 of the joint memorandum presented by the twelve non-aligned countries (CCD/310). That document expresses clearly and concisely the opinion of the twelve countries on this problem.

89. On the second problem, control over chemical weapons, our point of view is clear and I would not tax the Committee's patience by repeating the details. Our ideas concerning the system of control and guarantees have been set out in the draft convention (A/7655) and in the working paper (CCD/285). That system is based partly on national control measures and partly on the international procedures of recourse to the Security Council, bilateral and multilateral consultations between the parties. Those few delegations which do not share our confidence in this system recommend the creation of a special international control system based upon on-site technical inspections. However, the working out of such a system would be too difficult and ineffective to be practicable. The learned experts whom we have heard here and the many working papers, prepared with care and knowledge of the subject before us, dealing with the various aspects of control over chemical weapons confirm that conclusion. Moreover, many delegations have supported the principles of the system of controls and guarantees contained in the draft convention of the socialist countries.

90. I should like to say a few words on the aspects of national control, which in our opinion is fundamental to any system of control and guarantees, in view of the characteristics of chemical and biological weapons and of their production and stockpiling. Article 5 of the draft convention accordingly provides that --

"Each State party to the Convention undertakes to take as soon as possible, in accordance with its constitutional procedures, the necessary legislative and administrative measures to prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and to destroy such weapons."

(Mr. Petrov, Bulgaria)

In this connexion, may I draw the attention of the Committee to certain relevant passages in the statements made by the representatives of Sweden and Yugoslavia? In expressing the support of his delegation for the principle of national control as a basic principle, the representative of Yugoslavia said:

> "As to national legislative measures, we wish to stress particularly that in our view they represent the basic deterrent ... It would be very difficult to imagine that, alongside the laws which would completely prohibit chemical and biological weapons in a country, there could exist another set of parallel laws or regulations rendering possible whatever had been prohibited in this field by those laws." (CCD/PV.486, para. 12)

In its working paper (CCD/302) the Yugoslav delegation went even further and made detailed suggestions concerning the adoption of specific laws.

91. The Swedish delegation also considers that one of the chief characteristics of a verification system is --

> "... an undertaking by each party not to provide, nor to permit any juridical or physical person within its territory or under its jurisdiction or control to provide, to any recipient chemical or biological agents that might be diverted from peaceful uses to agents of warfare ..." (CCD/PV.480, para. 14).

92. The provisions of the draft convention of the socialist countries concerning international guarantee measures are contained in its articles 4 and 6 and in the working paper (CCD/285). Article 6 states the principle of consultation and co-operation between States parties in order to eliminate any misunderstandings which might arise. That principle has been welcomed by most delegations. As Mrs. Myrdal said at our meeting on 21 July:

> "The fourth step in the verification process, as we perceive it, would consist of a provision whereby the parties would undertake to consult and co-operate with each other..." (CCD/PV.480, para. 15)

Consultation and co-operation between the States parties is an international procedure also proposed by the Yugoslav delegation in its working paper.

93. It also seems to us that the right of each State party to have recourse to the Security Council in case of a violation of the treaty, to lodge a complaint and ask for an investigation strengthens the proposed system of guarantees and makes it more viable. We are glad that the majority of delegations share that view.

(Petrov, Bulgaria)

94. In concluding my remarks on control I should like to stress that the suggestions made during our debates on the principles governing the control and guarantee of a total ban on chemical and bacteriological weapons, set out in the draft convention of the nine socialist countries, are of definite interest to my delegation, and we shall study them in detail with all the attention and respect they deserve.

95. The discussion on the total prohibition of those weapons has recently been confined to the technical aspects of control. In this connexion I would venture to make some reflections which may be somewhat heretical. I believe that what is d hampering the progress of our negotiations is neither the difficulties of control nor the difficulties of joint prohibition, but rather a lack of will, of deep conviction in certain governments which do not wish to renounce the use of chemical weapons. Perhaps their military doctrine has something to do with that. Why, for biological weapons -- the control of which is much more difficult -- do they not insist upon the establishment of a special control system, on-site inspection and so forth? Because there is a conviction that those weapons will not be used, a will not to use them, for different reasons. And what the United States representative, Mr. Leonard, has said today confirms our idea.

96. Is not this insistence on the prohibition only of biological weapons, and not of chemical weapons, intended to create the impression that something is being done about both types of weapons of mass destruction? At the same time, implementation of the United States proposals would prohibit a weapon which is not "a necessary or even a useful counter" (CCD/PV.458, para. 54), as the United States delegation stated, and would even amount to some sort of approval of the maintenance of chemical weapons, which, again according to the United States delegation, "have obvious usefulness in certain military situations" (ibid., para. 58). Can we not see in that position taken by the United States an indication of a desire to maintain in its military arsenals those weapons which "have obvious usefulness" but which, allow me to recall, have been rightly condemned by civilized world opinion as a whole? The firm conviction of my delegation is, however, that our Committee should not leave the last word to those who hope to draw doubtful military advantages from the maintenance and use for military purposes of certain chemical agents.

97. Another problem of interest to my delegation was raised by the Italian delegation: the suggestion (CCD/PV.474, paras. 13-15) concerning renunciation of the reservations to the Geneva Protocol under which parties reserved the right to respect their

(Mr. Petrov, Bulgaria)

obligations under the Protocol towards the other parties that had signed and ratified it but to cease to respect them in regard to any enemy State whose armed forces or allies did not respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol. We are all aware that the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol and the two reservations, by their power of deterrence and their implied threat of reprisals, have made this instrument the first international agreement limiting weapons of mass destruction which is respected and valid on every count. To renounce those reservations would, in our view, reward those States which have not signed or ratified the Protocol and have always endeavoured to impose a restrictive interpretation on its prohibitions. Moreover, some countries which for the past forty-five years have not adhered to the Protocol now insist that certain chemical weapons should be exempt from its prohibitions. Quite obviously, in such circumstances the maintenance in force of the reservations is, to say the least, very appropriate. On the other hand, if an agreement based on the principles of the draft submitted by the socialist countries were concluded, those reservations would be completely pointless.

98. Mr. LEONARD (United States of America): It has come to our attention that two members of the Committee -- the Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, and the representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Sule Kolo -- will be leaving Geneva very shortly and, if I understand correctly, will therefore not be able to participate in the remainder of the work of this session of the Committee.

99. In the case of Ambassador Sule Kolo it appears that his Government has nominated him to a post carrying even more important and graver responsibilities than those that he has been carrying out here, which may make it difficult or even impossible for him to be with us more than in spirit at future sessions of the Committee -- something which we very much regret. I should like to hope for, and in fact actively solicit from both these representatives, their continued active support for the work of this Committee in the coming months -- in New York if their Governments can, in fact, spare them from their other duties --; because in the next few months we shall be proceeding to the final phases of the negotiations on the sea-bed treaty which have been going on here for over two years. It looks as though those negotiations will be one of the most successful endeavours of this Committee; and they are an endeavour to which both Ambassador Sule Kolo and the Under-Secretary of Mexico have given their serious personal attention and to which they have made very real and substantial contributions.

(Mr. Leonard, United States)

100. I should like to express the gratitude of the United States delegation, in which I am sure all delegations would join for their contributions to this and other matters -- including the interesting document (CCD/313) introduced this morning by Ambassador García Robles.

101. May I offer our best wishes to them on their travels? -- indeed travelling is a subject which is very much in the minds of all of us as this session draws to a close.

102. The CHAIRMAN (Japan): I am informed that Ambassador Sule Kolo, who has been the representative of Nigeria to our Committee for four years, will be leaving us and that his appearance at today's meeting will be his last. I am sure that I speak on behalf of all members of the Committee in expressing our sincere regret at losing Ambassador Sule Kolo from our midst. His great interest in our work, his wise counsel, his active participation in our deliberations and negotiations have made him a highly-valued colleague in the Committee. While we express our sadness at his departure, at the same time we wish him success and good fortune in the new post to which he goes.

103. Mr. PORTER (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, as representative of the country to which Ambassador Sule Kolo will now be accredited, I should like to associate myself with the tribute you have just paid to him on his last day with us in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. This Committee is losing one of its best representatives aswell as one who has always presented his country's views with distinction, whether within the Committee or, more informally, outside.

104. As for myself, I feel that with the departure of Ambassador Sule Kolo I am losing a colleague whose friendship I have always valued, not least perhaps for the frankness and humour with which he has sometimes commented to me on the British position. We in this delegation send with him our warmest wishes for a successful and happy time as Nigerian High Commissioner in London.

105. Mr. KHALLAF (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French): Mr. Chairman, may I associate myself with you and other colleagues in saying goodbye to our dear friend Ambassador Sule Kolo? Indeed, all of us here in Geneva, the permanent representatives as well as the representatives of countries in the Committee on Disarmament, have enjoyed the friendship of Ambassador Sule Kolo for two years or more. We have been able to appreciate his qualities as a man and as a diplomat. He is a great representative of a great African nation with which my country maintains the best possible relations. We wish him every success and all the happiness he deserves.

106. Mr. SULE KOLO (Nigeria): May I take this opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to thank you and my colleagues who have referred to my impending departure from this Committee for the kind words spoken about me? I have been assigned to other duties by my Government and consequently I have to relinquish my leadership of the Nigerian delegation to this Committee and at the same time, of course, my membership of the Committee. Transfers such as mine constitute a normal and regular feature of the Foreign Service; and in any case, after four successive years on this Committee, it may well be that it is expedient to bring in a fresh mind to grapple with the exciting but intricate work of the Committee. Nevertheless, I personally regret having to take leave of my colleagues in this unique body.

107. This is indeed a unique Committee, not only because the world expects it to accomplish a complex task which has exercised the best minds for decades, but also because of the devotion of its members and, above all, the friendly and informal relationship which exists among them. We have come a long way from the polemics and intense mistrust of the early days. Now and again speeches in the Committee may be dull and heavy going; highly technical statements by experts may sometimes tend to have a soporific effect on members who are straining their minds to the limit to grasp the meaning of seismographic equations being solemnly enunciated. But it is a mark of the uniqueness of the Committee that members seldom succumb to the well-known malaise of international gatherings — somnolism.

108. Speaking on a more serious plane, I have thoroughly enjoyed working with my colleagues here. In spite of the occasional sense of frustration arising from the seemingly unnecessary deadlocks in our negotiations, my experience in this Committee has been memorable and invaluable. We live in a dangerous world in which in the name of security the acquisition and accumulation of arms and armaments have increased by leaps and bounds; and yet, paradoxically, that senseless arms race has increased the sense of insecurity rather than banished it. The will-o'-the-wisp of the balance of terror is evidently not the answer to our search for peace and security; and time is no longer on our side. That is why a heavy responsibility devolves on this Committee in negotiating urgently the cessation of the nuclear arms race and charting a comprehensive programme for general and complete disarmament — a realistic programme which must take cognizance of the relationship between disarmament and international peace and security, and therefore embrace them, even though strictly speaking they fall beyond the scope of our negotiations here. The alternative is to draw up a programme for disarmament in isolation, which in my opinion would not be realistic.

(Mr. Sule Kolo, Nigeria)

109. Our progress in the past years has been minimal at best, and even this year we have little to show by way of success. Therefore, as I take leave of this Committee, I hope sincerely that the coming years will witness a higher determination, particularly on the part of the super-Powers, to pursue in good faith negotiations towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race, thereby facilitating and expediting the achievement of our ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament.

110. I leave physically, but my spirit remains with this Committee — as my very good friend Mr. Leonard has just remarked. I shall continue to follow the work of this Committee with keen interest and shall endeavour to contribute, albeit indirectly, to the success of that work. In the meantime I would say, in the words of Shakespeare, "Farewell and stand fast".

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 491st plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Hiroto Tanaka, representative of Japan.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United States of America, Poland, Mexico, Morocco and Bulgaria, by the Chairman and by the representatives of the United Kingdom, the United Arab Republic and Nigeria.

"The delegation of the United States of America submitted a working paper on remarks by Dr. Joshua Lederberg at the informal meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 5 August 1970 (CCD/312).

"The delegations of Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia submitted a draft comprehensive programme of disarmament (CCD/313).

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 1 September 1970, at 10.30 a.m.".

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.